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Bell, D.A. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2015.
Daniel A. Bell’s The China Model is a book in which the author’s “politics of location” is
placed front and center. Bell is a Western-educated political theorist who has long-taught in
various East Asian countries and is now at Tsinghua University in Beijing. The book was
published in 2015, before the swift rise of various forms of populism in Western Europe and the
United States and yet nonetheless remains prescient in its critiques of the limitations of electoral
democracy. Despite its current relevance, the book has been controversial since its release,
garnering numerous critical reviews, such as the one from Andrew Nation in China File.
Bell seeks to establish a “consequentialist” case for the limits of electoral democracy,
noting that while electoral democracy through “one person, one vote” mechanisms has “assumed
almost sacred status in modern Western societies” (p. 14), there are innumerable reasons that
such a system does not, in practice, necessarily produce “good government” in terms of measures
such as selecting “wise leaders,” promoting widespread sharing of economic benefits,
emphasizing environmental sustainability, or supporting “harmonious ways of resolving
conflict” (p. 19). Bell reviews four reasons that electoral democracy falls short on these
measures. The first, the tyranny of the majority, examines ways in which voters in democratic
countries are often ill-informed and often elect politicians who themselves fail to make policy
based on expert knowledge. Bell contrasts the electoral democracy system with the Singaporean
system, in which the training and selecting of political leaders includes the candidates’ taking of
exams and undergoing other rigorous selection procedures; Bell also notes that China, too, is
increasingly relying on meritocratic means to select its officials. The next critique of electoral
democracy, the tyranny of the minority, examines the phenomenon of increasing wealth
inequality and how this taints the political process; Bell argues that in contrast, a meritocratic
system may be more likely to promote policies that “curb the power of capitalists” and train
leaders who have a greater “sense of community” (p. 44). The third critique, the tyranny of the
voting community, examines how electoral democracy does not consider the interests of nonvoters, including foreigners, as well as future generations, which Bell considers to be especially
important in light of global climate change.1 Bell believes that a meritocratic system is better
suited to protecting the rights and interests of future generations. Finally, the tyranny of
competitive individualists makes democratic politics divisive and contrary to the goals of
“harmony” that many East Asians seem to desire. Bell argues that “most [Chinese] citizens
perceive China as a harmonious society” and that more democracy in China would be more
likely to “aggravate social conflict” (pp. 60-61).
Bell lays out a case for the qualities that leaders in a meritocratic system should have,
such as proper intellectual abilities, “communicative talent and emotional intelligence” (p. 90),
and “the motivation to promote the good of the people” (p. 101). He also lays out possible
various exam and performance-based procedures for choosing such leaders. In a subsequent
chapter, he does critique the problems of a political system in which its leaders are selected
through meritocratic processes. First, corruption is a distinct possibility due to the “absence of
independent checks on the power of the government”; “rent-seeking”2 in transitional economies
represents a similarly troubling possibility, as…. Also problematic are the low salaries of public
officials, begging the question whether individuals would be willing to undergo meritocratic
selection processes for such relatively low salaries. Bell finds that Singapore’s experience
provides a useful rebuttal for this last issue, however, with Singaporean officials being
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extraordinarily well-compensated. In the case of China, where corruption remains common, Bell
notes that corruption may be “substantially curtailed [but] only if it is seen to be deeply shameful
and being clean is seen to be a matter of honor for public officials” (p. 123). Next,
“ossification,” or the likelihood of stagnation in the composition of the leadership, is a potential
problem. Bell here seems to think that selecting leaders from “diverse social backgrounds” (p.
130) as well as implementing “new ways of measuring merit” (p. 134) could solve this problem.
Finally, Bell notes the difficulties of non-democratic systems in establishing legitimacy, though
he again provides a rebuttal to this concern, noting that China has succeeded in this area through
processes of “nationalism, performance legitimacy, and political meritocracy” (p. 139).
Bell examines three different ways of establishing political meritocracy. The first is
through changes in voting procedures themselves, such as by granting weighted votes to those
with more education or other qualifications of merit; however, Bell notes how difficult it would
be to get citizens to agree to such measures. The second is through the implementation of a
“horizontal meritocracy,” a concept Bell has supported through much of his writing career,
featuring multiple legislative houses, with the elected officials within some houses being elected
through universal suffrage and the leaders in others being appointed through examinations. Here
Bell is inspired by the Confucian political thinker Jiang Qing and his ideal of the House of
Exemplary Persons, which would promote “transcendent values,” a notion that Bell
acknowledges is “highly controversial” (p. 165). Bell also notes that the balance of power
between different legislative houses would likely eventually to be swayed toward the
democratically-elected one. Finally, Bell advocates a “vertical model,” featuring democracy at
local levels and meritocracy at the top. He argues that this is in fact precisely what is occurring
in contemporary China, with its mix of village-level democratic elections and rigorous,
meritocratic selection of officials at the national level.
In his conclusion, Bell expands on his hypothesized vertical model of democracy to
discuss what he views as the actually-existing but still-evolving “China model”—not the
supposed one featuring economic openness but political authoritarianism that is often written
about by Western observers—but rather one featuring “democracy at the bottom,
experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top” (p. 180). He acknowledges that a
vertical model system would still contain problems but claims that China is nonetheless currently
creating a viable model of political development that deviates from the norm of electoral
democracy that other democratic nations might wish to consider adopting.
This book has generated a fair share of controversy. Cynicism regarding the merits of
current democracies in the US and UK, for example, certainly make elements of Bell’s argument
in favor of a meritocratic means of selecting leadership and achieving a common good quite
appealing. Why shouldn’t we want leadership capable of informed, intelligent ruling on behalf
of some “common good”? Yet here we can start to see the flaws in Bell’s argument as well as in
how he supports it. Should the notion of “common good” be decided upon by educated elites?
And even if we can come to some idea of what a common good might entail, Bell fills his
argument with so many qualifications that his arguments in favor of a meritocratic model of
democracy come to sound hollow. For instance, he notes that Chinese citizens see their country
as harmonious, yet on the very next page, posits that increasing democracy in China would also
exacerbate social conflict. So is China really harmonious, or does it just appear to be so through
repression of social organization and other forms of criticism, which is actually increasing under
Xi Jinping? Finally, it may be unfair to critique Bell’s arguments using developments that
occurred after he published his book, but the 2016 Brexit vote would seem to challenge Bell’s
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consistent support of the use of referenda to facilitate public debate. For example, Bell argues in
favor of some national referenda in China to create an even more meritocratic system, saying that
referenda “tend to generate extensive deliberation and relatively informed debate” (p. 176); on
another occasion, Bell suggests that China would benefit from a referendum supporting greater
civil liberties.
Apart from the merits or weaknesses of his individual arguments, Bell never satisfactorily
answers the broader question regarding why democracy cannot somehow fix its own problems
rather than needing to be replaced. This is evident in many of his discussions, for instance, of the
need to create greater senses of community to overcome the dysfunctions caused by economic
inequality; arguably, more democratic participation and civic engagement, not less, would be the
best solution to this problem. He notes that corruption might be best resolved through making it
more “shameful,” yet he fails to address how this change in political culture might also be
something that can occur through democratic processes.
Because of the arguments presented in this book, Bell might be seen as an apologist for
Chinese authoritarianism. I think that charge is somewhat unfair, though there are times when he
paints an excessively rosy picture of the political system in China today. Certainly, it should be
possible to acknowledge and even celebrate the successes of CCP governance in China without
being an “apologist” for the country’s authoritarian ways. And this book begins to do that.
Nevertheless, a more measured assessment of democracy’s benefits as well as more empirical
discussion of China’s “actually-existing” meritocracy would make its case even stronger.
Notes
1

He notes that while China has a “disastrous environmental record,” there is a “growing public concern over air
pollution,” which has led to the consideration of future generations in the form of more environmentally-friendly
policies (p. 52).
2
Rent-seeking economic behavior broadly describes the allocation of economic resources toward unproductive
goals or toward projects that ultimately hamper economic efficiency rather than toward activity that would add
economic value to the economy.
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